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ABSTRACT

The origin of this thesis lay in the emergence of a minority group of „religious‟
activists in London, England. The purpose of this group was to establish “Shari‟a
Zones” in pockets of Waltham Forest and Tower Hamlets, wherein certain acts would
be prohibited and Shari‟a law would be enforced. This led to an examination of the
theological and religious beliefs of this small and much marginalized section of the
British Muslim community. What became apparent is that this group prescribed to a
view of Islam, and shariah law in particular, which is incongruent with the provisions
of human rights law. In complete contrast, as this thesis will explain, there are other
interpretations of Shari‟a law that are more complimentary to the tenets of human
rights and civil liberties on which British society is based. This assertion should
underscore how the principles of equality and justice are intrinsic to the Islamic
faith.Having identified the above divergence in the representation of Islam by this
sub-strata of British Muslims, this thesis will consider the British system within which
this group and other Muslims operate. This is primarily done to get a general idea
about how British Muslims are allowed and tolerated, by the system, to be as such.
The conclusion reached is that these particular Muslims are not just portraying in
inaccurate image of British Muslims, but they may well be practicing their religion
wrongly. Thus, their conduct is counter-productive and their purpose is self-defeating.
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I.

Introduction:

What it is:
Come late July 2011, residents of the London boroughs of Waltham Forest,
Tower Hamlets and Newham started noticing yellow posters around the neighborhood
announcing the Shari'a law enforcement zones.1 The posters read as follows:
You are now entering a Shari'a Controlled Zone | Islamic Rules
Enforced: No Alcohol, No Gambling, No Music or Concerts, No Porn
or Prostitution, No Drugs or Smoking | "Shariah" A Better Society.2
Members of one British Islamic group had perimetered certain neighborhoods
in London with posters marking Shari‟a-controlled zones: where certain acts and
behaviors were declared intolerable by Muslim residents, and punishable by Islamic
Law.3 At the end of the stretch, the project is designed as a building block towards an
Islamic Caliphate; historically seen as the ideal representation of unity in Islam.4 In its
details, however, it stands at a fascinating contrast with the surrounding society and
governing system. Furthermore, the project is designed to prove how Shari'a can
provide and safeguard for a better society in attempt to push for its incorporation in
UK law.5
The main question to be discussed in the course of this paper is the viability of
the demand to incorporate Shari'a law in the British legal system; from the lens of
both international human rights law and Shari'a law. Such viability can be determined
after an understanding of the perceptions of good in confrontation: the British society
(protected by UK law), the provided interpretation of Shari'a, and its compatibility
with international human rights law (highlighted in the five indivisible rights). The
compatibility between Shari'a and human rights is empirical to the evaluation of the
demand for several reasons. For one, UK law and human rights law have gone handin-hand for decades, seeing as the UK is a forefather of IHRL. Two, Shari'a has been
subject to numerous interpretations that present radically differing perceptions of the
good (ultimately, all leading to heaven but via different lifestyles). It is essential to
1

Stephen Brown, 'Shari'a-Controlled Zones' Sweep UK, FrontPage Mag, July 29, 2011.
Exhibit A
3
Soeren Kern, Europe on Edge: Growth of Islamistan in Europe means No-Go Zones for NonMuslims, The Cutting Edge, August 28, 2011.
4
MATHIEU GUIDÈRE, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, 67 (Jon Woronoff
ed., Scarecrow Press 2012) (2012).
5
Hugh Muir, Diary, The Guargian, May 17, 2011, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/17/hugh-muir-diary-anjem-choudary
2

understand the perception put forth by the Islamic group, even more so to contrast it
with another, to get a full grip of the possible outcome of the amalgamation of the
legal systems or lack thereof. Three, in the off chance of its incompatibility, it is
equally important to understand how the application of such an interpretation would
affect the enjoyment (or not) of human rights. As such, the viability of both the
demand and the interpretation can be determined.
This paper will take a brief look at the history of this Islamic group, the
ideological origins behind their project, and the possible manifestations and/or
repercussions of its outcome. Part I of this paper will serve to strengthen the notion of
an interconnection between the rights; as premises for the discussion of consequences
later on. Part II will serve as a brief introduction of the group: their historical origins
in UK and the ideological offensive at play within the society for the past decade. The
following parts will contain an elaboration of two contrasting, and almost equally
perfectionist, perceptions of the good: the Islamic Caliphate, projected by the nonsecularist group, vis-à-vis the Secular state, promoted by secularist intellectuals and
furthered by the UK government. The final part of this paper will entertain the
hypothetical outcomes of this project, and their consequences; specifically in relation
to the individual enjoyment of one‟s rights as governed by international human rights
law.
II.

The History

Al-Muhajiroun (“The Emigrants”) movement was founded in 1996.6 Omar
Bakri Muahmmad, its Syrian founder, global figurehead and Ameer (“Prince”) until
2003, is an infamous Muslim cleric, author of many publications such as The Road to
Jannah [Heaven], and The Duty of Jihad between Mind and Text.7 Recruitment for the
group centered around university campuses, where students presented fertile soil for
new ideas,8 and reportedly because they would be subject to identity crisis over not
integrating well with British society.9 Between the years 2004 and 2006, the group
suffered intellectual cracks that eventually broke it into two. Muhammed, followed by
Anjem Choudary10, carried on with the UK-based Da‟waa Network (“The Calling”),
6

Elie Issa, A Profile of Syrian Jihadist Omar Bakri Muhammad, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, December
21, 2012, at 1, available at www.Jamestown.com/Omarbakrimuhammad
7
Sheikh Omar Bakri Muahmmad, IZHARUDEEN, 2012, available at http://www.izharudeen.com/sheikhomar-bakri-mohammed1.html
8
HOME OFFICE, PREVENT STRATEGY, 13, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/preventstrategy-review.pdf [hereinafter Prevent].
9
Id.,18 and 22. Recruits notably targeted social outcasts, usually from conservative backgrounds that
made it difficult to embrace adventurous college life.
10
Anjem Choudary is a British citizen of Pakistani descent, and now leder of the organization.

2

as Al-Ghurabaa (“The Strangers”) whilst other more involved parties took on
overseas activities as part of the Jihad Network (“The Struggle”), as Savior (a.k.a.
Savior Sect).11 By end of 2006, both groups were proscribed by the Home Office,
under the 2000 Terrorism Act for “glorifying terrorism.”12 Shortly after the July 7
bombings of 2007, Muhammad fled to Beirut, and was sought as a suspect for the
attacks; leaving Anjem Choudary to resurrect the platform of the disbanded group. 13
According to several of his interviews, the platforms of Al-Muhajiroun, AlGhurabaa and Islam4UK (the reincarnation) are more or less the same. The group
aims at the non-violent overthrowing of the UK government, its replacement with an
Islamic state, from where they intend to continue with the Islamic domination of the
world.14 The members reject “standard liberal democratic ideals such as equality and
free speech,”15 and believe that their disbandment only serves to highlight the irony of
the illusion of free speech proclaimed by hegemonious states like the UK.16 They
portray the situation in the UK to be “limited, deficient [and] even dangerous,” as a
direct result of the application of a man-made secular system of government.17 For
them, Islam and Shari‟a law are the solution to all society‟s problems. Hence, the
yellow posters end with “Shari‟a | For a Better Society.”
Evidently to Michael Whine‟s commentary on the 2006 ban, which had
encompassed multiple organizations, a mere ban will not be effective. 18 Whine19
highlighted the need for the consistent, universal and effective application of legal
means, in order to ultimately put an end to the resurrection of different names.20 By
2010, Islam4UK got proscribed as well, Home Security then Alan Johnson expressed
concerns of alleged support to terrorism and terrorist attacks.21 Surely enough, the
members resurfaced in the news months later, under the name of Muslims Against
11

Id.
Id. Alan Travis & Patrick Wintour, Extremist Muslim Groups to be Banned, The Guargian, February
16, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/feb/16/terrorism.immigrationpolicy. Ellen
Parker, Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act 2006 - The Relationship Between Counterterrorism
Law, Free Speech, and the Muslim Community in the UK versus the US. 21 EMORY L. J. 711, 713
(2008)
13
Muslims Cleric Omar Bakri Muhammad Arrested in Lebanon, BBC, November 14, 2010, available
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11579274.
14
CATHERINE ZARA RAYMOND, AL MUHAJIROUN AND ISLAM4UK: THE GROUP BEHIND THE BAN, 11-12
& 32, May 2010, available at
http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/1276697989CatherineZaraRaymondICSRPaper.pdf
15
Id., at 11.
16
Id.
17
Id., at 17.
18
Michael Whine, Will the Ban on Al Muhajiroun Successor Groups Work? (Aug, 2006), available at
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/224/currentpage/10/Default.aspx
19
Michael Whine is the Government and International Affairs Director at the Community Security
Trust, and Defence and Group Relations Director at the Board of Deputies of British Jews.
20
Id.
21
RAYMOND, Supra note 14, at 21.
12

3

Crusades.22 It was through this platform that the Islamic Prevent strategy and the
Shari‟a Zones were introduced to the British society, both as strong ideological
retorting to the government‟s own strategies.23 With the erection of the zones, and the
announcement of an anti-Armistice day protest, current Home Secretary, Theresa
May, approved the proscription of MAC.24 Months later, members of the groups
resurfaced in the news as United Ummah (“united nation”).25
The Ideological Offensive
With the continuing rise in levels of terrorism threats that accompanied the
new millennium, major states, such as the United Kingdom, actively seek to protect
its territory, citizens and overseas interests. As part of the new counter-terrorism
strategy (CONTEST),26 the United Kingdom's government launched a particular
strategy in 2007, the Prevent Strategy,27 as a precautionary policy to stop people from
joining or supporting terrorism.
Having categorized the likelihood of a terrorist attack as "Severe",28
CONTEST identified four factors that enable the growth of 'terrorist' groups: conflict
and instability, aspects of modern technology, pervasive ideology, and
radicalization.29 In response to these identified factors, the UK government
formulated a quadrupled approach to counter the affect of their spreading. CONTEST
seeks to Pursue and stop terrorist attacks, Prevent and stop people from "becoming
terrorist or supporting terrorism", Protect and strengthen its "protection against
terrorist attacks", and Prepare to mitigate "the impact of a terrorist attack."30 Prevent
promised a more comprehensive approach towards dealing with threats of terrorism:
including working closely with a wide range of institutions, prisons, schools and even
22

Dominic Casciani, Muslims Against Crusades Banned by Theresa May, BBC, November 10, 2011,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15678275.
23
Anjem Choudary, Islamic Prevent, May 30, 2011, available at http://www.anjemchoudary.com/Islamic_Prevent. [hereinafter Islamic Prevent].
24
Casciani, Supra note 22.
25
London‟s US Embassy Demo: 22 Arrests Made, BBC UK, December 2, 2011, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-16006035. Arrests Made as United Ummah Demonstration
Turns Violent at U.S. Embassy in London, LIVELEAKS, December 2, 2011, available at
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=259_1322848814. Robert Spencer, UK: 22 arrested as “United
Ummah” protests “anti-Muslim drone strikes in Pakistan, JIHAD WATCH, December 2, 2011, available
at http://www.jihadwatch.org/2011/12/uk-22-arrested-as-united-ummah-protests-anti-muslim-dronestrikes-in-pakistan.html.
26
Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom‟s Strategy for Counter Terrorism, HM
GOVERNMENT, at 5, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contestsummary.pdf [hereinafter Contest].
27
PREVENT, Supra note 8.
28
CONTEST, Supra note 26, at 5.
29
Id., at 4
30
Id., at 6
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charities to address radicalization.31 Prevent further classified drivers of
radicalization, to offer a more in-depth understanding of the characteristics of
'radicalized' people, their support pathways and participation forms.32
Prevent was met with much concern from some United Kingdom Muslims; it
was seen as a “fishy” project that held more evil than good, especially when it comes
to the potential intervention into Islamic practice.33 This was particularly associated
with the touch points between Pursue and Prevent, which involved data collection
from the police with regards to potentially radicalized individuals.34 Not so long after,
the new United Kingdom government did find flaws within the first draft of Prevent,
thus, a reviewed version was announced in 2011. 35 Officials indicated the inherited
programme confused two government policies: they sought to clarify in the new
version that there is one policy to promote social integration, and a separate other to
prevent terrorism and tackle extremist ideology. 36 In the published review of the
policy, it was admitted that the "previous Prevent work has sometimes given the
misleading impression that Muslim communicates as a whole are more 'vulnerable' to
radicalization than other faith or ethnic groups."37 Additionally declared in the review,
was the non-establishment of Prevent as a "means for covert spying on people or
communities."38
Second drafts aside, Prevent was perceived as an ideological offensive the
government was launching against the Muslim populace.39 It was often interpreted as
a sinister situation to force Muslims to “sell out” to Western societies and conform to
the state‟s preferable understanding or accepted version of Islam.40 Consequently,
31

Jack Barclay, The Extremist Reaction to the UK's Prevent Strategy (Oct 2011), HUDSON INSTITUTE,
http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-extremist-reaction-to-the-uks-prevent-strategy
32
PREVENT, Supra note 8, at 17. Radicalized people are often in search for identity; hence they
embrace "terrorism" as a value system that appeals against their disadvantaged socially discriminated
status. Their support pathways are social networks and/or movements that promote group bonding,
indoctrination, and may include peer pressure.
33
Barclay, Supra note 31.
34
PREVENT, Supra note 8, at 31. Arun Kundnani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism,
INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS 28-9 (Oct. 2009), http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf. Vikram
Dodd, Government Anti-Terrorism Strategy „Spies‟ on Innocent, The Guardian, October 16, 2009,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/anti-terrorism-strategy-spies-innocents
35
PREVENT, Supra note 8.
36
Id.
37
Id., at 43
38
Id., at 32.
39
PREVENT, Supra note 8, at 40. SAIED R. AMELI, SYED MOHAMMED MARANDI, SAMEERA AHMED,
SEYFEDDIN KARA, AND ARZU MERALI, THE BRITISH MEDIA AND MUSLIM REPRESENTATION: THE
IDEOLOGY OF DEMONISATION (2007), http://www.ihrc.org.uk/file/1903718317.pdf. KRISTIN ARCHICK,
PAUL BELKIN, CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CARL E. MIZ, MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: PROMOTING
INTEGRATION
AND
COUNTERING
EXTREMISM
(September
7,
2011),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33166.pdf
40
Barclay, Supra note 31.
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Choudary authored a 28-page pamphlet a few days before the announcement of the
new and revised Prevent, explaining how it is a state tool to monitor its citizens and
intervene in their cultural affairs, among other things.41 Through the Islamic Prevent
strategy, the group expressed strong contempt towards the secular state; because it
was, in fact, secular, which goes against their fundamental belief regarding systems of
governance.42
Choudary initiated the strategy by consolidating a Muslim's identity solely to
Islam: "A Muslim cannot have any other identity that that of Al-Islam. He is a
Muslim first and last."43 By restricting the identity, Choudary effectively denounces
all affiliation to the state. Affiliating with the state also risks abiding by man-made
law; as opposed to Islamic law, which is also forbidden, as there is no substitute for
the dictates of God via Islamic verses of Qur'an.44 Therefore, notions of "secularism"
and "democracy" are to be absolutely rejected as untrue and "against the basic tenets
of Islam."45 Understandably then, Muslims are to avoid taking part in the legislative
authority: which issues man-made laws for the secular non-Muslim society.46
Accordingly, Muslims are not allowed to join the British army or the police forces:
since they are not affiliated with the state, they should not take part in its security
forces or defend territory other than the "Muslim Land".47 In keeping with the
booklet, the possibility of fighting Muslims while on the army side of the conflict is
an act of apostasy.48
One provision continues to prohibit the existence of any bond between two
other than Islam.49 Thus, this perception effectively denounces all social ties with
non-Muslims as well. This latter premise is further supported later on in provisions
that prohibit the engagement with non-Muslims and the celebration of their
secular/religious festivities, all of which are alien to the Islamic community.50
Muslims are to reject interfaith and benefit only the Muslim community.51 In the
event that some Muslims had been integrated with the non-Muslim community that
they behave in a manner different than instigated by the booklet (namely by Shari'a),

41

IZHARUDEEN, Supra note 7. ISLAMIC PREVENT, Supra note 23.
ISLAMIC PREVENT, Supra note 23.
43
Id.
44
Id., at 18-23.
45
Id.
46
Id., at 26.
47
Id., at 16.
48
Id., at 8.
49
Id., at 10.
50
Id., at 24-25.
51
Id., at 24.
42
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they are to be rehabilitated into proper conduct, as there is no "freedom for a Muslim
to behave as they please."52
Towards the end of the pamphlet, Muslims are encouraged to promote these
provisions set forth by the Islamist group, abide by it themselves and never dare to
oppose its promulgation or execution.53 To an extent, it introduces a shift from right
to duty of being a Muslim, where it is part of one's Islam to promote the religion and
the application of Islamic Shari'a law.54
Evidently, members of MAC called on Muslims to boycott the non-Muslim
society, to “stick to their own” in the hopes of creating a Muslim Emirate and selfgovern.55 Hence, lectures were held, speeches were given after Friday prayers;
pamphlets were spread around town, all for the purpose of “exposing” the
government‟s true intention behind Prevent.56 In order to consolidate Islamic thought
and avoid exposure to the westernized model, numerous UK Muslims confined
themselves to certain neighborhoods, marked the neighborhood perimeter and
announced the enforcement of Shari‟a law within said boundaries.57 Evidently, such
area became ones where “The Muslim community will not tolerate drugs, alcohol,
pornography, gambling, usury, free mixing between the sexes; the fruits, if you like,
of Western civilization,” as Choudhary told the Daily Star. 58 Since then, there has
been strong demand for the application of Shari‟a law as the governing law for the
UK: explained as a necessity to achieve a uniform civil code, as well as a healthy, sinfree environment, where threats to national security are dealt with in a more effective
manner.59

52

Id., at 27.
Id., at 26-28.
54
Id., at 29.
55
IZHARUDEEN , Supra note 2
56
Saqib Bukhari, New Report Exposes British Government's Plan to Change Islam (April 4, 2010),
Available at http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/analysis/europe/9143-new-report-exposes-britishgovernments-plan-to-change-islam. HIZB UT-TAHRIR, THE FUTURE FOR MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN,
http://www.hizb.org.uk/solutions/report-the-future-for-muslims-in-britain.
57
Brown, Supra note 1.
58
Dominik Lemanski, Sharia law hits the UK, THE DAILY STAR, (July 2011), available at
http://www.democracyforum.co.uk/immigration/96781-sharia-law-hits-uk-daily-star-sunday.html
59
Venky Vembu, Let the Mullah rant on Sharia: We need a uniform civil code, FIRSTSPOT (Feb
2012), http://www.firstpost.com/politics/let-the-mullah-rant-on-sharia-we-need-a-uniform-civil-code224839.html
53
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III. The Caliphate Ideal
What Dominic Gover described as "Muslim vigilantes battling to rid London
of "evil" drunks and prostitutes",60 should be further understood with their
'radicalized' ideal in mind. The 'value system' in such an ideal goes beyond the mere
failure of the police to deal with prostitution and drunkenness, as Gover reported off
Choudary;61 It presents a perception of the good, while profoundly distinct from that
of the "secular" state, is entrenched in ancient Islamic tradition.
In its origins, the project was designed to serve the Prophetic end of an Islamic
world dominion.62 Given the literal interpretation of Anjem Choudhary, and before
him Omar Bakri Mohammed, the world shall be ruled by Islamic governance. 63 Thus,
they self-portray as one tool that would catalyze the process of this prophecy. By
creating the Shari'a zones, they seek to initiate miniscule governorates adhering to
rules of Islamic law, that would spread wide enough to join perimeters and create an
Islamic Caliphate.64 These emirates are envisioned to grow into full-fledged states
that would come to unite the world under Islamic rule.
In its execution, the project is explained more in layman terms and a status
quo requiring them to take on such a considerable stance. It was primarily devised as
such to protect the rising numbers of Muslims in the UK (a significant 5% of the
population) from the "satanic values of the British government."65 Having to live in a
society as diverse as the UK, under the auspices of a secular democracy had contained
much hardship for these particular Muslims. In a diverse society, answering to a
secular government with no Islamic reference, these Islamists lived in fear of losing
their identity as devout Muslims. For them, like many others regardless of variations,
Islam is a lifestyle; it is a rulebook to life and to one's affairs with God, himself, his
family, and even with strangers.
This attitude is a direct application of Sayyid Qutb's research and
interpretation of Islamic law and Shari'a. Where other Islamic thinkers will be

60

Dominc Gover, Anjem Choudary: Muslim Vigilantes Battling to Rid London of „Evil‟ Drunks and
Prostitutes, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, January 23, 2013.
61
Id.
62
Anjem Choudary, Eid Khutbah 2012: The Legacy of Islam in Britain (August 19, 2012), available at
http://www.anjemchoudary.com/Eid_Khutbah_2012_The_Legacy_of_Islam_in_Britain_by_Anjem_Choudary. Taj
Hashmi, Global Muslims' Double Jeopardy: Islamophobia and Globalization, available at
http://www.muslimsocieties.org/Vol_6_No_1_Global_Muslims_Double_Jeopardy.html.
63
Id.
64
Soeren Kern, Britain's "Islamic Emirates Project", GATESTONE INSTITUTION, July 21, 2011.
65
Id.
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involved in this discussion, Qutb66 (d. 1966) will remain a pillar in the understanding
of this group's platform, means and end result, simply because of the strong impact
his philosophy had on their project; which will be emphasized as the discussion
continues. Islamic thinkers included in this discussion had contributed to the debate
on Islam and state, and/or had (likewise to Qutb) critiqued contemporary Islamic
schools of thought.
The Islamic Caliphate is the "ideal representation of unity in Islam."67 The
implementation of the Caliphate combines both theology and jurisprudence for the
foundation of Islamic basis.68 Qutb wrote elaborately on al-wahdah al-kubra ("the
great unity"), what he coined as the ultimate goal for Muslims; to unite in solidarity
under Islamic law as it effectively deals with law and provisions for worship, from
which social relations are derived.69
A Caliph, the ruler, is seen as the supreme political power that governs and
guides people through all aspects of life in all Islamic territories, as instigated by
Shari'a -Islamic law.70 Islamic thinker Ali Abd al-Raziq71 (d. 1966) wrote on the
existence of government in Islam, highlighting Islam as a religion and state.72 In
response to many critiques, Abd el-Raziq explained:
What I do believe and what I have suggested in my book is that Islam
is a legislative religion (din tashri'i), and the Shari'a impacts on all
spheres of life… if the Muslims agreed that their government should
be a Caliphate and viewed the Caliphate as the foremost system for
their common welfare, then the Caliphate is a lawful Islamic
government (hukumah shar'iyyah) and the people must be loyal to it.73
Where Abd el-Raziq conditioned the Caliphate to conclude the 'agreement' of
Muslims, Qutb propagated a more strict interpretation of the Islamic state. In his
book, Ma'alim Fi al-Tariq (Milestones), Qutb makes a clear distinction between

66

Sayyid Qutb was one of the most important figures in the development of the Jihadi Salafi ideology.
Despite his humble origins, Qutb enjoyed both Western and Islamic education. Qutb's writings
critiqued notions of reconciling Western ideas and Islamic ideals.
67
GUIDÈRE, Supra note 4, at C.
68
Id.
69
SAYYED KHATTAB, THE POWER OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
SAYYID QUTB 9 (Routledge 2006) (2005).
70
GUIDÈRE, Supra note 4, at C.
71
Ali Abdel Raziq was an Egyptian scholar and a religious judge. His writings were seen as
controversial for the methodology he applied in debating the role of religion and Islamic history with
government and politics.
72
KHATTAB, Supra note 69, at 2.
73
Id., at 9-10.
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hakimiyyah and jahiliyya.74 The first is derived of the word hukm, coined by Qutb to
express authority and command; thus hakimiyyah expresses government.75 Qutb saw
the entire universe as issued by God, the Creator, hence it is regulated by his rule, and
that is 'visible' in the texts and the derived Shari'a.76 As Sayed Khattab explained,
hakimiyyah is the ordinance of a man's life, regardless of any gradual alterations and
developments in man's life, it cannot change his "nature to another being". 77 Going
back to the provisions set forth in the Islamic Prevent, Choudary insisted that a
Muslim's only identity is Islam; where he cannot support nationalism, tribalism, or
even "Britishness".78
Hakimiyyah for Qutb stands as the crossroads between Islam and Jahiliyya; a
term he used to describe any form of government that is non-Islamic, such as
socialism, democracy and capitalism.79 It was also used to describe the attitude of
Muslims who transgress against the rule of Shari'a and the establishment of an Islamic
state.80 In fact, Qutb, along with other Islamic thinkers, promoted the strife against
those Muslims.81 This divisionary attitude is promulgated by Islamic Prevent, which
calls for the rehabilitation of Muslims "who have been affected by the western way of
life."82
While strongly so, Qutb was far from being the only Islamic thinker with this
view in mind; Gad el-Haq83 (d. 1996) had also propagated the wrongfulness in
separating the religion and the state.84 In his writings, he urged Muslims to follow
Islamic law, or what Mohamed al-Nawawi85 described as Dustur ("constitution"),86
and to detach from the western example; where "English churchmen allowed for their
own overpowerment."87 Al-Nawawi (d. 1278) and Al-Qurtubi88 (d. 1230) had agreed
with the succession of Al-Imamah or Al-Khilafah to prophethood.89 Both believed in
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the natural order of a God-instigated law, to be adhered and furthered, and monitored,
by one imam or khalifa ("caliph").90 Thus the western example portrays the
decentralization of authority into several elements, as opposed to being consolidated
in one knowledgeable man, all of which are operating within a framework set by other
mere "men". In the debate on man-made law and God-instigated provisions, Qutb
presents a rather discernible argument:
If it be despicable for one to say, for instance, that the sun is an ancient
reactionary (raja'i) creature and must be replaced by anew developed
star! Or to say, man is an ancient reactionary creature and should be
exchanged for another progressive creature capable to develop the
earth! If these and others are despicable, it would be more despicable
to say the same sayings in respect of God's law conveyed in the Qur'an,
the final message of God to mankind.91
For Choudary, and the proponents of Islamic Prevent, Muslims should only
abide by the Shari'a, they are not allowed to adhere to a system operating by manmade law.92 Seeing the strong impact Sayyid Qutb and other Islamic thinkers have on
the restrictive interpretation of Islamic law by this group of Muslims, the outcome is
seemingly incongruent with human rights law. Evidently, the provisions of Islamic
Prevent stand at the other end of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights
as provided for by international law. The next chapter will offer other interpretations
that are more compatible with universal human rights.
IV.

On Congruency

This other perception of the good portrays Islam to be in congruency with
human rights, such that it identifies with many features of democracy and steers away
from the Islamization of constitutions. The first perception focuses entirely on the
institution of the Caliphate, where the application of God's laws applies to all features
of life, individual and political; aided by state tools centralized in the Caliph - seen as
both a political and spiritual leader. Thus, religion and state are eternally intertwined.
Contrastingly, this perception softly breaks down such ideology through a different
interpretation of Shari'a and the objective of divine messages.
The discussion in the following paragraphs borrows from certain jurists from
different times in Islamic history. The works of these jurists reflected significant
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contribution to certain Islamic theories and shaping Islamic rulings through
independent reasoning; all which are more harmonious with the understanding and
application of human rights law.
In an interview on BBC radio, Rachid Ghanouchi93 explained that "a state is
more Islamic, the more it has justice in it."94 In justifying his residency in the UK for
20 years evading political prosecution in pre-revolution Tunisia, Ghanouchi
explained, "I was going to a country ruled by a queen where people are not oppressed
and where justice prevails."95 As the head of the ruling political party, elected in postrevolution Tunisia, Ghanouchi believes the prevalence of justice to be the essential
key to the true application of values in the Qur'an, as opposed to the literal reading of
it as disseminated by other Islamists.96
The conceptualization of justice as a key value in Islam dates back to Rifa'a
Al-Tahtawi97 (d. 1873), a renowned scholar and reformist during the Abbasid
Caliphate in Egypt,98 who identified the then-illness of the Muslim Umma to be the
lack of freedom. After a five-year mission to Paris, Tahtawi returned to Egypt with a
newfound appreciation for equity and justice.99
The stipulation of the equality of all French citizens before the law "has great
power in establishing justice, in helping the wronged and satisfying the poor by
convincing them that they are great as far as legal proceedings are concerned," he
commented in one manuscript.100 In another publication, Tahtawi categorized freedom
as fivefold: natural, behavioral, religious, civil and political.101 Where natural
freedom originated with mankind (the right to have access to food and drink without
overstepping that which belongs to others), behavioral freedom defines
"commendable conduct and noble morals," which reflect individual integrity.102
Religious freedom lies in that of opinion and doctrine, conditioned to adhere to the
principles of religion, the respect of which leads to civil freedom, as "the rights of a
93
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city's residents and communities toward each other."103 All these categories must be
engaged in legitimate transactions, safeguarded by the state as the citizens' political
freedom.104
For Tahtawi, the foundation of these freedoms, through just and sound laws,
creates a counterbalance between the two rights, that of the state and of the
individual.105 The restriction of people's freedoms, without legitimate reason, is
considered "a denial of their recognized right of happiness."106 On the premise that all
humans were created with two eyes and two hands, Tahtawi's conclusion attributed
their freedoms to their equality, and that was associated with justice and
benevolence.107 The absence of this justice and the freedom of each individual, he
believed, was the illness that took over the Caliphate at the time, "when rulers reigned
by whim, doing what they pleased, and the people had no way to oppose their rulers
or defend the rulings of Shari'a."108
Going back to Sayyid Qutb's distinction between hakimiyya and jahiliyya, the
objective of the rulings of Shari'a, he perceived, to regulate the universe with all its
ordinances. However, there is a strong counter movement to this school of thought.
Al-Shatibi (d.1388) and Ibn Ashur (d. 1973),109 for instance, agreed that the highest
objective of all divine messages is to establish justice and realize peoples' interest, to
guide reason and promote the values of religion.110 Furthering their concept of
separation between religion and politics, Ghanouchi highlighted a distinction between
two systems: Mu'amalat ("Dealings") and Ibadat ("Worship").111 The latter is
concerned with creed and values, which represent the more constant features of life,112
where the primary orbit of religion is understood not to be the state apparatus, rather
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personal convictions.113 In this sense, Islamic jurisprudence provides for answers to
the big theological questions; and includes a guideline as to how acts of worship are
performed. The former domain revolves around the general interest of the public, i.e.
maslaha.114 According to Ghanouchi, this domain is by no means constant, on the
contrary, it is ever evolving and adapting to new developments.115
Given Tahtawi's emphasis on equality of opinions, among other things, and his
understanding of how Shari'a should be defended against 'whimsical' leaders, it is
important to understand how the 'people', i.e. the Umma, have a say in matters. Asifa
Quraishi116 explained Shari'a to be God's Law, "The ideal of how people should be in
the world."117 Where she stipulates the inability of the original texts to provide for
answers to "every single life and legal question," she explained the evolution of fiqh
("Islamic Jurisprudence") as a set of linguistic canons of construction, consensus and
reasoning; developed by jurists to attempt to provide for some of the legal matters.118
Evidently, fiqh is not manifest in every aspect of life, and jurists cannot claim the
absolute correctness of their reasoning as they concede to the possibility of their own
fallibility.119 Thus, fiqh presents guidelines for worship and "commendable conduct"
among people.
Islamic law is derived from two major sources: the divine revelation, Shari'a
(commandment set forth by divine texts, or wahy), and fiqh (the product of human
reasoning).120 Shari'a provides for general directives, whereas fiqh is the tool through
which legal answers to unprecedented issues are explored.121 Therefore, fiqh stands to
be a "rational endeavor… a product of speculative reasoning, which does not
command the same authority as Shari'a."122
Jurists developed other tools to embrace societal and legal changes; one of
which is Ijma' ("consensus") of the Muslim Umma. For Wael Hallaq123, ijma' is the
ultimate sanctioning authority which guaranteed the infallibility of positive legal
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rulings;124 Jurists found evidence in both Qur'an and Sunna in support of the
authoritativeness of ijma'.125 Many jurists found evidence to support the Prophet's
seeking of his companions' advice, their shura ("consultation"), provided his
acknowledgement of the fallibility of his own reasoned opinions.126 Hence, ijma', as a
source of Islamic law, mitigated the interruption of revelation with the Prophet's
death; allowing for the formation of new solutions to arising problems.127
Tahtawi and Ghanouchi both believed that neither fiqh nor ijma' can, however,
guide farmers on progressive technology, or assist with exchange of commodities
between merchants;128 which compromises some of the features of Ghanouchi's
second domain, Mu'amalat. They can provide for the behavioral guideline and values
of Islam. As for civilizational matters, Tahtawi had stressed the highest form of
freedom to be that of agriculture, industry and trade.129 For those are the key
operatives to public benefit and the civilizing factor for great nations.130
Tahtawi was the first to call for a foreign-inspired political concept to be
applied in a Muslim state; the multiparty system.131 Founded on the equality of all
citizens, and their right to be represented in the political arena, Tahtawi believed it be
the remedy to the failing Caliphate system.132 Obligating people with religious
practice, Ghanouchi as leading to the promotion of Munafiqin ("Pretenders"), where
people seemed to adhere to the Caliph's (usually religious) instructions, regardless of
their own personal conviction.133 The Islamizing of the constitution of a Caliphate
meant the adoption of one school of thought, which would later reflect that Islam
before the world, and "pluralism in this context [the multitude of Islamic thought
schools] goes to the side, becoming a mere commentary."134 Quraishi feared the
repetition of such a module; for it would once again change the way people regard
Islam and Islamic law.135
Ghanouchi followed in Tahtawi's steps and offered the borrowing of one
method of Mu'amalat from the west, in addition to the multiparty system; the electoral
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system.136 Justified as the means to highlight the occurrence of ijma' and a successful
way of representing the peoples' say in political and legislative matters.137 An
electoral system becomes a procedure that allows the multitude of citizens to show
their consensus. Evidently, the state would be a neutral element, where its scope is
limited to the public domain.138
A true and efficient separation of religion and state is heavily based on the
provision of both institutions to fulfill its purpose. The state is an actor, created out of
a societal need for order and protection of its individuals; while religion is a divine
message sent by the Creator to His potential followers to introduce them to the modes
of worship. This perception of the good is meant to offer an alternative interpretation
for those who wish to learn the difference between Islam and Islamism. Both
perceptions were entertained to highlight, two examples of, the radically differing
interpretations of Shari'a law. The Qutbian model represents a restrictive application
of Shari'a; where adherents are more conservative in their own lifestyle and less
merciful to and tolerable of others. Contrastingly, the Ghannouchi-Tahtawi approach
to understanding Shari'a promotes equality among adherents, thus more tolerance. It
does not restrain freedom or impose practice upon people. Nonetheless, both models
are far from being exclusive defaults of 'good' and 'bad' interpretations; Shari'a has
never ceased as subject of interpretation.
In the coming discussion, apostasy will serve as a brief examination of the
widely differing approaches to legal questions via Shari'a. Furthermore, it will provide
insight on policies instigated by states that have chosen to centralize their authority in
the one ruler; more so, it will highlight certain underlying political goals that
'influence' the Islamic legal approach rulers undertake in dealing with apostasy. More
often than not, their rulings are not without prejudice.
V.

Invalidating Thoughts

Al-Ghazali defined apostasy (ridda) as the open declaration of an individual
refuting their belief in God, and (despite attempts to subdue) persisting in disbelief.139
The offender announces he is a non-believer after having been a Muslim, and in some
cases, can urge others to follow suit; and as such, he denounces his relationship to the
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Muslim community. Apostasy is applicable only to Muslims; if non-Muslims convert
to other faiths, they are said to have „changed religions‟.140
Islam was one of the earliest democracies constituted on earth, given the
historical inclusion of Ahl el-ra‟i (opinion leaders) through the practice of shoura with
respective leaders of the Muslim world.141 While shoura is slightly different from
democracy, in that it does not entail the rule of people by the people, it is coined as
the “freedom to express views, exercised by the opinion leader only insofar as this
does not affect any of the components of the religious doctrine or the cult.”142
Subsequently, this limitation prevents rising tension between Muslims, in and among
themselves, or with non-Muslims; namely because Islam prohibits offense to others,
and moderation in response to offense from others.143 As such, the classification of
offenders was identified.
On one side, some jurists asserted that Islam did not provide an earthly
punishment for every violation believers commit.144 Of the justifications, is the
assertion of how people were created as mere witnesses of each other‟s doing in this
life.145 Going back to the original texts and classical Islamic jurisprudence, there
exists evidence to denote the permission of expression and more importantly, the
repeated assurance of an afterlife punishment for kufr ("disbelief"), not an earthly
one.146
In classical Islamic jurisprudence, apostasy was punishable by death.147
However, upon re-examination of the policy invoked by scholarly lawyers, who
argued that apostasy was not a hadd (“restrictive ordinance”), a more lenient
punishment was devised.148 More modern schools of thought believed, when a
Muslim is suspected then proven to have apostatized (i.e. denounced the oneness, or
even the existence of God), they are declared as such before the public; and in most
cases, a domestic court announces their „civil death‟.149 In other words, they are
legally and socially announced as non-Muslims, and, therefore, all their relations to
other Muslims are disconnected. For one, they are separated from their spouses by
140

Maurits S. Berger, Apostasy and Public Policy in Contemporary Egypt: An Evolution of Recent
Cases from Egypt‟s Highest Courts, 25 HUM RIGHTS 720-740 (2003).
141
Bassem Tibi, Islam and Modern Ideologies, 18 INT J MIDDLE E STUD 15-29 (1986)
142
Id.
143
Griffel, Supra note 139.
144
Jawdat Said & Afra Jalabi, Law, Religion and the Prophetic Method of Social Change, 15 J LAW
REL 83-150 (2000-1)
145
Frank Griffel, Moderation 401-2 (2003) http://www.al-qalam.org/EQ-3.pdf
146
Id.
147
Rudolph Peters & Gert J.J. De Vries, Apostasy in Islam, 1 Die Welt des Islams 1-25 (1977)
148
Id.
149
Berger supra note 123.

17

force of law; and they are prohibited from entering into new marriages, even with a
non-Muslim.150 Furthermore, their blood ties with their children are considered nonexistent, to and from whom they are prohibited from passing or receiving inheritance,
or to and from any Muslim relative.151 Apostates are considered malicious influence
hence they are excommunicated.152
It is the Shafi‟ite belief that apostasy is derived from the same legal
positioning of hypocrisy (nifaq).153 A hypocrite, contextually, is one who „pretends‟ to
be Muslim, to have faith in God and believe in all three messengers, as part of refuge
in the Muslim community and protection from its wrath; such as the wars following
the prophet‟s death. 154 On the basis of their secret disbelief and, hence, secret practice
of non-Islamic rites, Al-Shafi‟i deduced a definition and punishment for apostates.
Where an unbeliever is one who had lost faith after being a Muslim, and has publicly
declared this revelation, an apostate goes further to conclude omission or failure to
repent (istitaba).155 Therefore, it is pillared on the staging of faith where in fact, the
heart conceals otherwise, since Islam puts great weight on the intention of a
believer.156
In sharp contrast, legal scholars, such as Cherif Bassiouni, argue that since
intention is a significant, private and concealed notion, there is no determining
whether a non-believer has actually repented or not.157 In essence, they should be left
to their own devices, in the hope that they will find their „path to God‟ once more.
Moreover, Bassiouni believes that putting a deadline on their istitaba may convince
them into nifaq just to get away from capital or civil punishment.158 A suspect of
„apostasy‟ should not be penalized for exercising his freedom of religion and belief.159
On this thought, another Islamic school comes into the debate, the Postponers
(Murji‟a).
As a low-key jurisprudential school, the Murji‟a were marginalized during the
Ummayyad dynasty for questioning the rules of God.160 They believed in the
postponement of a Muslim‟s punishment or reward (on their degree of faith) till the
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Day of Judgment.161 For one, they believed that “it was not possible for human beings
to pass judgment over the status of another human being‟s faith.”162 Secondly, they
resorted to Qur‟anic verses that warned sinners of grave punishment at the end of
God‟s decision.163
Qutb's great unity and Tahtawi's freedoms come into play when whimsical
leaders enjoy centralized authority, so much so that Shari'a becomes a political tool to
dissolve the 'united' community.164 One significant evidential issue would be the
imposition on the right to freedom of expression when it comes to literary works that
addressed the existence of God or Islam, or offered “too-liberal interpretations of the
word of God.”165 This censorship was justified as: socially, a restriction on liberal
thinking prevented individual autonomy from climaxing into a loss of faith.166 Sociopolitically speaking, censorship was invoked to prevent heresy leading to the
dissolution of the Muslim
When Shari‟a failed to provide legitimate grounds for the criminalization and
the punishment of apostasy, a third solution was to resort to foreign laws and
incorporate them into domestic legal codes. The adoption of Public Policy is a
relatively new concept in the legal systems of Muslim countries; Egypt, for one, only
adopted it in the beginning of the 19th century.167 This policy incorporates the “legal
principles that are considered fundamental to a society, and which may not be
contradicted, altered, or violated by any rules or laws of that same society.”168
Basically, it is the legal tool through which state legislatives identify a crime and
punishment – a crime that cannot be identified by means of another legal system,
namely, Shari‟a. This policy goes along with the underlying understanding of Article
10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights; which subjects freedoms of
expression (expressed in article 10(1)) to:
Formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law… in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of
161
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others… for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.169
Under this policy, and the legitimized and, already, rationalized control over public
opinion, several Muslim authors were apostatized during the 19th century.170
Therefore, it appears that rulers are more concerned with carefully constructing legal
webs to trap authors who promulgate intellectual ideas of which they do not approve.
When Islamic law could be used to make that happen, Islamic law was applied. When
its provisions could not punitively provide for the crime, public policy became more
convenient.
Such differing interpretations offer a better understanding of the potential
political use of Shari'a and Islamic legal codes to benefit some over others. More so,
they offer a profound understanding of how radically different interpretations have
become, and how strict and restrictive these interpretations can be. At the more
radical end, some Muslims assume authority to execute punishment over others; and
at the other, Muslims conceding to their humility as equal before God and their
incapacity to judge others. One model offers justice and equality, whereas the other
involves judgment and superiority. One involves decision made by one centralized
figures, often adhering to single school of Islamic thought, that cannot be countered
by 'the people', and another model more involving and tolerant of the plurality of
interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence.
VI.

The Amalgamation

The Islam propagated by adamant adherents to a restrictive interpretation
disseminates a conception of Islam that reduces audience to pro-Islam and anti-Islam.
Such non-accommodation of other varieties in fiqh sends out a clear message that
Islam is a restrictive concept, unyielding and intolerant to any changes in the
surrounding society, political era or intellectual movement. The discourse in the
previous chapter was dedicated to support the separationist notion in Islam; that a
state is Islamic where certain foundations are safeguarded by the state (justice and
equality); not in its punitive and restrictive application of Shari'a. The following
discourse will offer a more expansive understanding of Shari'a to explain the
necessity of finding common grounds between the different schools of Islamic
thought. Furthermore, this understanding will serve to find common grounds between
169
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Islamic law and international human rights law, and evidently, UK law. This
particular perspective will become the bar against which the three scenarios will be
evaluated.
Because classical fiqh was based on medieval societal settings, and because it
only provides legal answer for legal issues, disparities arose between Ulama ("Islamic
scholars") as they struggled to contextualize society in accordance with Islamic rule,
or use the scientific jurisprudential rule of Islamic law as reference in dealing with the
constantly changing surrounding society.171 With the arising differences in
interpretation, and consequential lifestyles that Muslims from different schools led,
some Ulama feared the loss of the common grounds that united the Muslim Umma
under Islamic law and Shari'a.172 Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), followed by Ibn Al-Shatibi
(1388), made a profound contribution to Islamic law by terming and specifying its
main objectives and purpose, Al-Maqasid ("Goals").173
Maqasid Al-Shari'a (sing. maqsid), simply explained, are the ultimate goals
and main objectives or purposes of Islamic law.174 Historically, the strongest critique
of philosophers, theologians and jurists' observed arrival at partial and superficial
knowledge, albeit using jurisprudential tools, was Imam Al-Ghazali175; he believed
the provided answers did not reach the "precinct of the heart and the soul."176 AlGhazali perceived the highest form of wisdom and religious knowledge to go beyond
the confines of this material world and embrace more the ultimate aim of Islam,
which promises eternity in heaven.177 The challenge he posed to intellectuals merely
served to emphasize his argument against strict legal interpretation and reasoning of
the original texts. For Al-Ghazali ratiocination applied to mathematically deduced
rules and regulations failed to provide for the non-legal features of life on Earth, and
what is to come in the afterlife.178
Al-Ghazali's academic and legal writings are said to have contributed to the
"cause of reason", evidently, he left behind a "neatly structured rational system of
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meta-jurisprudence," where he introduced a new paradigmatic shift in the
understanding of the objectives of Shari'a.179 The part of concern of Al-Ghazali's
meta-jurisprudence is his identification of five main objectives that are to be protected
as "absolute priorities": faith, life, intellect, lineage and property.180 Al-Ghazali wrote
passionately on the concern of the maqasid discourse in relation to the "the values and
realities of concern to the individual and the society."181 Years later, some jurists,
such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi added freedom and human dignity to Al-Ghazali's five.182
These five objectives will serve as the building block for the establishment of
common grounds between Shari'a and human rights law in later paragraphs.
The aforementioned five main objectives were described as the ultimate goals
that Shari'a seeks to protect and guide followers to achieve.183 Al-Ghazali validated
Jihad (" Sacred Struggle") to protect one's faith.184 Jihad simply denotes the
protective measures Muslims are allowed to take to protect their religion; however,
the range of interpretation concerning the "protective" measure varies from one school
to another.185 A moderate view of jihad simply promotes the peaceful and nonaggressive protection of Islam through da'wa; in essence, fulfilling the Muslim's
mission of justice.186 A more fundamental interpretation of jihad entails a strong, solid
and forceful protection.187 Qisas ("Equal Retaliation") was emphasized by Al-Ghazali
to establish the value of life; irrespective of religion or ethnicity.188 Theft, adultery
and alcohol-consumption are "punishable offences as they pose a threat to the
immunity of private property, the well-being of a family and the integrity of the
human intellect, respectively."189 Not only so, but Shari'a, as Al-Ghazali wrote,
promotes work and trade so individuals can earn their living; it provides for detailed
family laws to protect, strengthen and safeguard the unity of the family. 190 These
essential maqasid encompass the all-pervasive and central theme of Shari'a; hence all
its laws are related to protect these benefits.191
On his part, Imam Ibn Al-Shatibi believed it was not enough for people to
learn the hukm ("Injunction") of a legal issue; rather, it was all the more essential for
179

Id., at 538.
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Issues in Legal Theory of Usul and Prospects for Reform, 40 IIIT 5, 15
(2001)
181
Id.
182
KAMALI, Supra note 171, at 45.
183
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Maqasid Al-Shari‟a Made Simple, 13 IIIT 1-26, 15 (2008)
184
Id.
185
GUIDÈRE, Supra note 4, at 186.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
KAMALI, Supra note 182, at 171.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
180

22

them to understand the hikma ("Wisdom and Purpose") behind it.192 Al-Shatibi
believed it was the profound understanding of hikma was what allowed the Prophet's
companions to rule remote provinces during the Islamic empire; they met the needs of
the people because they fully grasped the purpose of Shari'a: equality and justice.193
In his greatest publication, Al-Muwafaqat ("The Agreements"), The Book of Higher
Objectives, was one volume of it, dedicated to explain the objectives of the law (both
as briefly attempted by previous scholars, and expressly based on his research),
presenting them as "a visible and recognizable entity; no longer could they be
disregarded, forgotten or belittled."194
For his fear over the dissolution of the Muslim Umma, Al-Shatibi had two
goals to accomplish. He believed the concept of Maqasid would help keep the Umma
intact through the establishment of a unified corpus juris of Shari'a, one that would
integrate the varying visions and goals of the different interpretations by scholars and
jurists.195 In modern terms, this integrated code can be understood as a legal top-down
approach to embrace the changes in the surrounding society and embrace the
variations in interpretations, bearing in mind Quraishy's previous assertion regarding
the fallibility of jurists. Al-Shatibi had another purpose, where he aimed to sensitize
individual Muslims to the meaning of Shari'a, so that they can become "willing
carriers of its values'.196 He believed that the "higher objectives of the Lawgiver can
only be fulfilled by correcting the objectives of those answerable to the Law."197 This
presents a more bottom-up approach, where Muslims represent their religion (and way
of life) with understanding and high awareness of the reasoning behind their actions,
which would reflect upon their 'interfacing' and their relationship with the law of the
land.
The contributions both imams, among others, have made to the Islamic
jurisprudential system can be collated in Ahmed Al-Raysuni's words:
This is an entirely new step for the field of usul al-fiqh and its related
writings; for while the higher objectives of the law were once no more
than a specific point which might be mentioned or referred to on this
or that occasion in the context of usual-related discussions, [AlShatibi] caused them to become a spirit which flows through most
aspects of this discipline. This same spirit likewise flows with clarity
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and force through the discipline and world of jurisprudence by virtue
of the fact that the objectives of the law have now been introduced
into the realm of fiqh-related independent reasoning, whether for the
purpose of understanding and interpreting a text and deriving rulings
therefore, or for the purpose of arriving at a ruling on a situation about
which no specific text exists.198
The following part will examine a potential amalgamation between human
rights law and Islamic jurisprudence. An essential part of this paper is concerned with
finding an Islamic jurisprudential approach that is compatible with human rights. For
one, it would answer the question of whether there exists one (or several)
interpretation(s) of Shari'a that can go hand-in-hand with human rights law, and
evidently with UK law. Secondly, and of more significant to main question, is
whether the compatible approach mirrors the ideologies with which the Islamic group
introduces the Shari'a zones project and their demand to incorporate Shari'a law.
Consequently, the conclusion arrived at through the latter venture will conclude the
viability of their demand. In the coming paragraphs, a brief and relevant background
on human rights follow will precede its amalgamation between one perception of the
good promulgated by Islamic jurists.
VII. The Indivisible Rights
After the end of the Cold War, several positive measures were taken in
remedying the ideological barriers drawn out by the global political polarization; all to
highlight the indivisibility of the two generations of rights. The most vital measure of
which was the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993, where Article 5
declared all human rights to be "universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated… [to be treated by communities] in a fair and equal manner, on the same
footing, and with the same emphasis."199 Article 5 also designated states as
responsible to "promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms,"200
regardless of their political, cultural and economic systems. In 1998, the UN
Commission on Human Rights adopted several resolutions reaffirming "the
universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelationship of all human
rights… promoting and protecting one category of rights should therefore never
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exempt or excuse states from the promotion and protection of other rights."201 The
conceptual association becomes more emphatic: CPR & ESCR are to be thought of
as- interchangeably- indivisible, interdependent, interrelated and universal.
Moreover, human rights are to have prima facie priority over the "interests and
desires of society and state."202
From a more on-the-ground consideration, the Peru's Truth and Reconciliation
Committee (TRC) had pioneered an investigation that went beyond the mere listing of
the "violations" and into the contextual reasons for their happening. Based on the
TRC final report, the status quo allowing for the violations included social exclusion,
racial and class lines, high death/killing rates in the poorest areas, unequal distribution
of political and symbolic power, corrupt judicial mechanisms and disappearance from
rural highlands.203 It was the conclusion of the TRC that the Peruvian government
showed "profound lack of appreciation for the less privileged."204 An entire chapter
was dedicated to report on the psychosocial, sociopolitical and socioeconomic harms
at both personal and community levels.
The legal system of international human rights law seeks to protect the
individual, sustain and develop their equal and inalienable right to a "good life":
featured by equality, justice, enjoyment of rights and protection against violation or
coercion.205 It is a rational and goal-oriented system that pursues a wide-scale level of
conformity among citizens and states. Much of the same can be said about Shari'a; it
too is a rational and goal-oriented system that promotes widespread conformity. And
both contain restrictions against causal harm. The following paragraphs hold a
comparison between Shari'a and human rights law. This paper relies on a limited
number of Islamic jurists and scholars, simply because they were the most influential
in the development of the following discourse. This does not go to say that they were
the only ones supporting the strong correlation between both concepts.
With particular regard to this chapter and the last, several words comprise the
main objectives, perhaps the maqasid, of both Shari'a and human rights law: justice,
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equality, freedom and public interest. The sequential ordering of those words, in and
of itself, bears significance to the reasoning behind their establishment and protection.
The preambles of both ICCPR & ICESCR can be equated with the definition
of maqasid; they set out the core aim of the conventions, which in itself represents a
general and ultimate objective. The preambles start with an assertion of justice,
among other things, as one of the fundamental achievements in the world along with
freedom and peace.206 Justice is the primary requirement of an Islamic state, as
Ghanouchi and Ibn Ashour had stipulated. It stands as the building block of a society
where all individuals are on equal footing in terms of their relationship with the law.
Al-Tahtawi was particularly impressed with the strong emphasis on justice in the
French constitution of 1814:
Consider the first article: it has great power in establishing justice, in
helping the wronged and satisfying the poor by convincing them that
they are great as far as legal proceedings are concerned… What they
[the French] hold dear and call liberty is what we [Arabs] call equity
and justice, for to rule according to liberty means to establish equality
through judgments and laws, so the ruler cannot wrong anybody, the
law being the reference and the guide.207
Establishing justice, therefore, in the prescription of both Shari'a and human rights
law, means the right of all citizens to fair treatment, and to the enjoyment of equal
rights; in addition to the application of just laws upon wrongdoers without prejudice.
This equal setting denotes equal rights, the stipulation of the "inherent dignity
of all the members of the human family,"208 and the equal protection of both; all of
which is sought and promoted by both conventions and Shari'a. The equality of those
rights is portrayed in the preambles as the foundation for justice. 209 It was strongly
highlighted by Al-Tahtawi's argument of equal setting since creation (two
eyes/ears/hands for everyone), and the understanding of it was described by Ibn AlShatibi to be essential in meeting people's needs. Thus far, justice and equality in
Shari'a correlate with civil and political human rights. An equal footing for all in
voting, for example, reflects a civil freedom in their equality of choice, and political
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freedom for self-determination as stipulated in ICCPR: the people choose their
representatives and share aloud their political choice.
The realization of people's needs through promoting their equal -and
inalienable- rights evidently means, adhering to Al-Tahtawi's model, the realization
and non-restriction of their right to happiness without probable cause. Thus, their
freedom is not restrained. Although the conventions do not detail the term freedom,
Al-Tahtawi's fivefold definition presents a perception that is harmonious with human
rights law. Al-Tahtawi's natural freedom relates to the basic human rights as
enshrined in the Universal Declaration: food, water & shelter;210 it entails the right to
live. Protecting this natural freedom can very well fall under the maqsid of life: states,
Muslim states and/or ratifying to the conventions, are obligated to protect the people's
lives and provide for their survival and safety- through a supportive welfare system
for example.
His idea of behavioral freedom promoting commendable conduct can be
associated with cultural rights; since both are manifestations of a particular set of
beliefs that individuals act upon and are intimately related to their sense of identity i.e.
his intellect. These three features are to be safeguarded by the state pursuant to
observe and promote both maqasid and/or human rights law. Al-Tahtawi's civil
freedom relates more so to social rights than civil rights. He explained civil freedom
as if "the social community formed… joining together to honor each other's rights."211
Provided a state where justice and equality are well-established, and the people's
freedoms are unrestrained. However, private enterprises exercise their freedom to the
extent of arbitrary employment and termination. The state has to safeguard the equal
opportunity of every citizen, and protect their identities against discrimination through
regulations promoting the mutual respect of each party's rights, culture, social
background and intellect.
Religion, faith, the freedom of doctrine: all understandably refer to one pivotal
right to be preserved, promoted and protected by the state; under both Shari'a rule and
human rights law. A just state where citizens enjoy equal rights, they are free to
choose their religion and faith, they should be protected by the state without
prejudice, and should have a mutual understanding and respect with those of different
faiths. In this case, any acts of intolerance taken by the state are most likely to reflect
upon and affect the existing mutual respect. A state could refuse to recognize a certain
religion and deprive the people of enjoying their right to faith.
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Al-Tahtawi coined the term political freedom to refer to the state tools through
which people are assured of their legitimate and recognized property; i.e. citizens
engaging in legitimate transactions concerning their personal property are guaranteed
its protection by the state. This understanding is different from the contemporary
understanding of political freedom. For one, it draws upon the nature of the
relationship between state and citizen then and there; 19th century Arab world political participation took a different form, shura. This consultation mirrored a smallscale form of political participation where the Prophet sought reasonable advice from
his companions when revelations did not provide for specific instructions. Therefore,
shura as a principle, at the time, reflect an appreciation of individuals and their
intellect and opinion; both of which the contributors held ownership to and expressed
freely.
Noteworthy to highlight the mention of property in both conventions; article
2(1) for instance:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.212
In this and other references throughout the conventions, property is presented as a
potential basis for discrimination; not as a right, or maqsid, that should be protected
by the state. Contrastingly, it is distinguished in Shari'a, whether in Al-Tahtawi's
model213, or Al-Ghazali's coining of maqasid, as an entity that states are obligated to
protect in the pursuit of people's right to happiness, and the state's own fulfillment of
political freedom. Evidently, property, as a maqsid, becomes the hikma behind
banning consumption of alcohol (perceived as toxic material causing unreasonable
behavior) and stealing - i.e. threats to it.
Freedom of trade was prioritized as having the greatest public benefit. AlTahtawi saw as an "art of governmental administration… [where] the greatest
difficulty for the person who appreciates the benefits of these arts is to see these
spheres restricted."214 He believed a successful trade system, one that truly advances
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civilizations, is based on progressive civil education.215 Education thus becomes the
tool for expanding agricultural, trade and industrial spheres, impressing upon rulers
the capability and qualifications of the people so they do not consider restraining their
trade freedom.216 This understanding parallels that of economic rights: in the free
disposition of natural wealth as a right to all people and the equal opportunity for all
to be employed. The ICESCR, assuredly, contains more specific and contemporary
guidelines that parallel the economic era.
In view of the above correlation, it becomes important to remind of a passing
remark made earlier about Imam Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's initiative to add human dignity
and freedom to al-Ghazali's fivefold maqasid of Shari'a.217 Al-Tahtawi's model and
Al-Qaradawi's conclusion serve to support the correlation between the notion of
freedom prescribed by both Islamic Shari'a, in its modern interpretation, and human
rights law.
Where foundations of equality and justice are prevalent in a state's legal code,
the people are regarded as equal, and their enjoyment of all rights are safeguarded and
promoted. When the people are allowed to be free, as per the aforementioned fivefold
conception, their needs are realized. In Shari'a, the needs of the people, their welfare
and benefit is coined as maslaha ("benefit").218 Al-Ghazali impressed maslaha further
as God's objective, His own maqsid in revealing Shari'a; precisely in the preservation
of the fivefold maqasid. The concept of maslaha was developed by Al-Ghazali to
arising and new cases that the scriptural sources do not address.219 From then on,
maslaha was researched as a notion to bring about legal reform: jurists researched the
constitution of legally valid masalih and the tools to realize the people's needs and
benefits.220 Jurist Ubayd Allah Sindhi (d.1944), identified with maslaha as tool for
reform of law which is not eternal, and where maqasid and hikma advance the
progression of fiqh that is more embracive of people's needs.221 In essence, Shari'a and
human rights agree on the course of realizing people's rights through tools that
safeguard the public interest.
Shari'a and human rights law mirror not just the other's positive perceptions
for the advancement of people's interest and the achievement of justice, equality and
freedom. They also align on the restrictions inherent in both philosophies for the very
215
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same objectives. Shari'a carriers and human rights law proponents share a call of
awareness, the former willingly chooses to portray the principles of Shari'a for others
to see; while the latter spread awareness and knowledge of the laws so people would
embrace their underlying principles and promote their abidance. In essence, both
parties willingly embrace the mission of da'wa and inviting people to learn more
about the philosophy they promulgate. Similarly, this da'wa stops at being a calling;
for neither philosophy encourage the use of coercion as a means to an end. Human
rights law warns against coercion as it directly impairs any individual's freedom.222
Rachid Ghanoushi had explained the adherence risk of coercion - the consequence of
pretenders,223 whose personal conviction and intellect are sheathed by a façade of
pretense that proves to be harmful for individual, society and faith.
The apostasy case evidenced Islam's strong emphasis on equality of all parties
before each other, where no one is designated superior to others in a way to allow
them to pass judgments on them. Islam provides no validation for inferiority in
mu'amalat among adherents.224 The above has proved justice, equality and freedom in
Islam to be global concepts that apply to all. This global application of the codes of
Islamic law was the main derive behind Ibn Al-Shatibi's initiative to establish a
unified code; so that it does not become arbitrary or stray away from the core
objective and hikma behind it.225 In the same way, these concepts represent the
foundation of universal human rights law that discriminate against no one culture,
religion, sex, language, ethnicity, color, race or gender.
An examination of the correlation between Shari'a and human rights law is a
pivotal stop towards the advancement of rights and the founding of justice, equality
and freedom, and the realization of people's needs. A steer away from radical
interpretations of Shari'a serves to understand the true and original maqasid and
objectives Islam has to offer and its adherents should seek to achieve.
The next chapter will thoroughly examine the British system within which
Muslims operate in order to contextualize the application of human rights in the state
where certain Muslims call for the application of Shari'a in its most restrictive
interpretation. An understanding of the extent to which UK law allows for the
realization of their rights and needs as a religious minority will serve the evaluation of
the scenarios to follow.
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VIII. The UK System
To arrive at a fair (but somewhat personal) justification, or lack thereof, on the
incorporation of Shari'a law into British law, it is necessary to take a passing look at
the context: the legal and political systems and, evidently, the society. This enables us
to have somewhat of an appreciation of the status of Muslims in the UK and the
degree to which their co-existence is tolerated. Of course, this cannot be done without
consideration of other religious minorities, or groups, within the same society. In
terms of the bigger picture, this will help to determine the level of their achievement
of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.
Throughout its history, the English system went through several stages of
development: among which are; the separation between the Church and the Prince's
Magistrate in late 17th Century226, then Toleration in mid 18th Century227, followed by
numerous Acts that reflect the ratification of international treaties and human rights
law, especially in the past century. Family matters went from the jurisdiction of
Ecclesiastical courts to becoming civil law.228 With the surge in religious groups and
minorities, religious courts became authorized to focus on family affairs of marriages
and divorces.
The past century has witnessed the most changes in the toleration phase of
religious groups. One brief example would be the introduction of the Racial and
Religious Hatred Act of 2006. In 1998, the London borough of Merton sought
prosecution of a British National Party (BNP) member for anti-Muslim incitement, for
campaigning against what he called "the Muslim problem". However, the prosecution
request was "rejected on the grounds that Muslims were not covered by the Public
Order Act."229 For several years, UK Muslims launched legislation campaigns for
religious incitement.230 In mainstream media debates, this was considered a move to
curb others' freedom of speech. However, the Muslims' side was significantly tipped
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when other minorities, such as Sikhs, were mocked for passing as Arab-looking; in
terms of appearance. Consequently, incitement to religious hatred was added as a
criminal offence via the Racial and Religious Act of 2006.231
A.

Legal System

In its present status, English law encompasses several overlapping laws that
recognize and regulate religious groups and individuals; where the laws of the Church
of England, originally the most ancient and prevalent, are part of the general legal
system, i.e. the law of the land.232 The following overview will help to determine
whether the legal framework of the UK provides for equality of all members of the
community and the prevalence of justice among them.
In recognition, all religious groups are allowed to practice their religion the
same as the Church of England.233 With the understanding that certain religions (such
as Judaism & Islam) hold more significant guidelines on the conducting of family
affairs, such as marriage and divorce, the state has created a contractual bond to give
religious groups some legal standing to enforce "discipline[s] within their body which
will be binding on those who, expressly or by implicating, have assented to them."234
This has come to be known as the doctrine of Consensual Compact.235 With this
understanding, the rights granted by the Arbitration Act of 1996 236 are applied to
create religious courts; where Parties to a dispute should be "free to agree how their
disputes are resolved."237 This act allows the parties to "make their own arrangements
by agreement but provide rules which apply in the absence of such agreement…
[where] it is immaterial whether or not the law applicable to the parties' agreement is
the law of England and Wales."238 As a result of this act, religious groups, such as
Orthodox Jews and Muslims, established religious courts to oversee and perform
marriages, and rule on the validity of divorces.
The decisions of these courts are recognized and enforced by English
courts; they are not subject to judicial review such as is the case for decisions by
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the Church of England.240 The religious laws applied by these courts are "free to
operate where the law is silent."241 Judges of the English courts have demonstrated
several times their status towards decisions of the religious courts. Eady J held that
"such disputes as arise between the followers of any given religious faith are often
likely to involve doctrines or beliefs which do not readily lend themselves to the sort
of resolution which is the normal function of a judicial tribunal."242 Lord Hope
pressed how "it has been long understood that it is not the business of the courts to
intervene in matters of religion,"243 Munby J interpreted the recognition of religious
courts to mean that "the starting point of the law is an essentially agnostic view of
religious beliefs and a tolerant indulgence to religious and cultural diversity."244
Simon Brown J was presented with a case where the claimant requested the court to
perform a judicial review of a Chief Rabbi's decision, Brown refused the matter on the
basis that "there was no governmental interest in the decision-making power in
question… the Chief Rabbi's functions are essentially to initiate spiritual and religious
functions which the government could not and would not seek to discharge in his
place were he to abdicate his regulatory responsibility."245
In regulation, certain mechanisms have been instigated by the state so that
such courts and institutions register to acquire a legal status. The simple regulations
are prescribed in acts that determine the courts be registered as a place of worship.246
The registered places are to be dedicated to certain functions, namely the
solemnization of marriages247 and issuance of religious divorce. They could also be
registered as a Charity248 for the purpose of the advancement of religion.
The more complex regulations are dual purpose; the first being the restriction
of the courts' role to religious divorce. Seeing as both marriages and divorces must be
registered at state civil institutions- alongside the religious rituals, divorce diverges to
more legal consequences that are primarily dealt with by civil courts; such as child
custody.249 Thus, religious courts, depending on their ritual, coordinate their divorce
procedural along with the state's regulation: for Muslims, Shari'a courts require
documentation of civil divorce to show for the parties' intention and certainty to seek
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divorce in order to grant it; with Jews, the procedure set by the Beth Din courts goes
the other way around.250
While civil courts are not authorized to perform judicial reviews to decisions
by religious courts, the courts cannot enforce any decisions where there is "public
policy which requires the court not to."251 Like any contract, agreements to arbitrate
necessarily have to show a genuine agreement to arbitrate by the parties.252 Therefore,
agreements obtained under duress or contracted with minors cannot be enforced under
the British civil law.253 In some cultures, men will seek to marry young girls under the
British legal age for marriage. Such marriage contracts are nullified by the state for
the incapacity of the girl to be a party in the agreement.254 This can be seen as both a
regulatory precaution and a limitation of the scope of the religious courts. Either way,
these restrictions seem rightfully based on principles international human rights law.
The handling of divorces by civil courts is also an extension of the necessity of
accordance with public policy. When acquiring a divorce, there are more
considerations than just the ending of a relationship between two parties of a
marriage. Ancillary matters relating to dowries, and more importantly, child custody
are on the line. Despite the fact that certain religions provide guidelines on how to
resolve such dilemmas, English courts are still the designated authority responsible to
dissolve marriage and all existing legal ties in accordance with British law. Judge
McFarlane was faced with one case where Muslim divorcing parents needed to settle
custody of their child.255 Despite the consideration for religious laws, and that of
expert statements, the Judge ruled to grant custody of the child to the parent who has
provided the primary care for the son: in that case, the mother.256
In the English legal system, any dispute outside performance of marriage and
divorce is one between the Crown and the Defendant, not between the parties.
Disputes of domestic disturbance, or commercial nature that involve sanctions on
either parties, even if ruled over by a religious court, will be invalidated by civil
courts.257 One example is a case of two Iranian Jewish merchants who export Persian
carpets.258 Where this case involved a breach of Iranian law, the Court of Appeal
recognized the arbitration award but refused to enforce the contract on the grounds of
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its illegality.259 One party was in breach of a commercial contract, thus sanctions were
to be pursued for his actions, thus the Beth Din court was recognized to have
jurisdiction, but its decision remained invalid.260 Any court that attempts to enforce
any physical punishment stands to be legally liable under English law.261
Neither Muslim nor Jewish communities have a preset hierarchy of tribunals
within their court system.262 As such, there is no appeal process. However, and with
specificity to Shari'a courts, the autonomous status each separate court enjoys, like
many other institutions of arbitral nature, can sometimes be seen as giving much
leeway for forum shopping.263 Parties can seek the opinion of a second Shari'a court if
they disagree with the decision of the first one they sought. Moreover, the notion that
Shari'a courts do not, separately, apply a specific school of thought (theoretically of
the four main ones), can sometimes be seen as a shortcoming of the courts.264
However, all these of critiques can be generally applied to any arbitral institution as it
does not possess the rigidity of legal courts, and tribunals are subject to apply the case
law of the parties' choice.265
While some look at the Christian origins of the UK and maneuver that fact to
reflect upon the intolerance of the state and its citizens, the aforementioned
description, however brief, of the English legal system provides for the contrary.
Furthermore, as political theory explains, the law of the land is a reflection of its
society, and the society is but a reflection of its legal system. Parliamentary acts tend
to produce legislation, which reflects the attitudes and wishes of the electing
majority.266 And, although the UK is originally Christian, that does not mean that
toleration is a concept that is alien to it. As Locke explained in his defense of the
independence of the Church of England, "the business of true religion is quite another
thing. It is not instituted in order to the erecting of an external pomp, nor to the
obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to
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the regulating of men's lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety."267 Based on
which, he continued in later pages to explain how Christianity promotes toleration,
"As for other practical opinions, though not absolutely free of all error, if they do not
tend to establish a domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church… there can
be no reason why they should not be tolerated."268
Lord Phillip's words seem most convenient to put the legal discussion in a
nutshell, "British law has, comparatively recently, reached a stage of development in
which a high premium is placed not merely on liberty, but on equality of all who live
in this country. That law is secular. It does not attempt to enforce the standards of
behavior that the Christian religion or any other religion expects. It is perhaps founded
on one ethical principle that the Christian religion shares with most, if not all, other
religions and that is that one should love one's neighbour. And so the law sets out to
prevent behavior that harms others… A sin is not necessarily a crime."269
Even though Christian at heart and in origin, the legal system does not appear
to discriminate against religious minorities or promote intolerance towards them.
Quite the contrary, legislators have attempted to meet the needs of existing religious
minorities because they are different; so that each group can better apply and abide by
their religious rules and regulations; such as Orthodox Jews and Muslims, in
matrimonial matters.
B.

Civil-Political System & the Society

On the socio-political domain, which will pave the way for the civil, economic
and cultural domains, it is important to keep in mind that law is a reflection of society,
and that it is the framework through which the state induces changes in the society.
On one angle, John Locke asserted that a government's legitimacy relies on the
people's consensual agreement on its protection of their -basics- life, property and
liberty.270 On the second angle, deep-rooted in British law are the provisions of
International Human Rights Law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
to begin with, where article 3 asserts everyone's right to life, liberty and security. On
the third angle, Al-Ghazali interpreted Maqasid Al-Shari'a, the purpose and
philosophy behind Islamic law, to be life, faith, intellect, lineage & property. In more
modern studies, Youssef Al-Qaradwi, the Egyptian Islamic theologian, added freedom
and human dignity.271 In the space between this triangular operation of law and
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philosophy, lie the Islamist groups of the United Kingdom seeking to execute the
Shari'a project.
Each system provides support for the freedom of faith and religion. Each
system seeks for the protection of intellect and belief. Consequentially, each system
values the individual for what they are and what they believe in, and their right to
their life, as a right of birth.272 It does not become so far-out-of-reach to perceive all
individuals as equal; in terms of their right to lead a life, follow their own belief
system and receive protection from the state. Furthermore, it does not stand so
erroneous as to perceive the systems themselves as equally influential on the
individuals that adhere to them.
The incident against religious incitement mentioned before, signifies a certain
level of intolerance that Muslims, and possibly other minorities, faced at a certain
point in time as citizens (or immigrants) in the UK. One of the reasons why Muslims
focused on rallies and movements was because they were not represented through
mainstream media.273 This case was fairly recent, it took place in 1998, and the
Religious Hatred Act was adjusted in 2006, it took effect in January 2007.274 One has
to wonder why it took so long, and it consumed as much time as it took citizens to
accept foreigners. For years, immigration was presented more as a concern than a
plus. Ben Page275 placed the UK on a multicultural spectrum between France and the
USA: France having ignored cultural differences, and the USA having been built on
the idea of immigration.276 Perceivably, the UK is working its way away from France
and closer to the USA; seeing as how US citizens are more comfortable with their
differences.277 On its way to embracing cultural differences, the citizens were 'taken
aback' by the high numbers of foreigners entering the country,278 and the media hub
and its coverage of asylum migration waves in 2004.279 Between the years of 1999 to
2007, surveys showed increasing percentages of citizens concerns towards
immigration.280 Contrastingly, the same surveys indicated the citizens' perception of
the benefits of immigration and multiculturalism: opening up Britain to new
cultures.281 Despite the London bombings of 2005, surveys showed consistency with
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regards to concerns and benefits. However, a new comment was provided, that
foreign-born must earn their citizenship.282 The concept of earning citizenship will be
further dwelled upon during the evaluation of the demand to incorporate Shari'a law
since it will serve then to look at the members of society promulgating this demand.
Another important parliamentary act worth mentioning is the Equality Act of
2010, which requires "public bodies and others carrying out public functions to
consider in their day-to-day work the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination,
advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations."284 This sets the legal, thus
the political and civil, footing for equality of all citizens before the law, and
consequently, before state institutions and acting bodies.285
283

C.

Economic Equalization

The elevation in legal status, served to induce an equal, yet slower elevation in
the economic and social status. On one side, Islamic banking has been taking strong
leaps of growth in the past five years.286 The main feature of Islamic finance is the
non-existence of profit, which is an unacceptable concept in most readings of Shari'a.
In order to better accommodate and facilitate the lives of Muslims, the government
provided for the establishment of Islamic banks.287
Moreover, the UK, being a "leading international financial centre"288, saw a
spur in popularity of the Islamic banking system and came to appreciate its principles
of fairness, social justice, individual economic well-being, collective profit-sharing
and loss-bearing, and economic prosperity.289 The Islamic financial system meshed
well with the London market's flexibility to embrace and adapt.290 As a result of
English enterprises branching out in the Middle East, using the Islamic Window
concept to promote its banking services, served to resonate in the English streets.291
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From 2001 to 2007, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)292 had worked to
authorize Islamic financial institutions (three banks) and helped simplify the
differences between the many banking systems in the UK.293 By 2005 and 2006, the
Finance Act was introduced, and it placed the Islamic banking on the same tax footing
of other, more global, banking systems.294 The government's framework for taxes and
legislation has been paving the way for the introduction of new Islamic products such
as insurance, bonds and mortgages.295
D.

Socially Speaking

Among the cultural differences that Islam introduced to the UK, are
polygamous marriages. English law stands firmly and persistently against bigamy and
polygamy, Section 11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 definitively voids
marriage of such nature.296 Nonetheless, to embrace the social and cultural trends
associated with Muslims, the state recognized polygamous marriages, if and when
performed outside of the UK, in a state that allows for the occurrence of polygamous
marriages, and where the wife applying for immigration seeks it in a capacity other
than her being a spouse.297 It is worth mentioning that, up to 2007, the state has
recognized over a 1000 polygamous marriage.298
Once spouses have become citizens of the state, and provided certain
regulations concerning payments of insurance, they can apply to receive state
pensions. As Chris Grayling explained,
For income-replacement benefits such as income support, incomebased jobseeker's allowance and income-related employment and
support allowance, the husband and the first wife claim as a couple.
Subsequent wives receive an additional sum, which is less than the
single person rate.299
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It is also worth mentioning that, unlike other European countries, Muslim girls
and women in the UK are at liberty to wear, or not, headscarves, or full-length
niqab.300
E.

Cultural Aspect

Appreciation of religious groups can be seen on the cultural level. A simple
yet powerful example would be the slaughtering of animals. In 1995, the Welfare of
Animals Regulations301 were introduced in embracement of religious groups, namely
Jews and Muslims, whose religions require certain procedure for the killing of
animals for the purpose of feeding.302 This would explain the Halal signs displayed by
certain shops in the streets of London, signifying that all meats served were
slaughtered in the merciful manner required by both religions.
In the month of Ramadan303, MP Jon Ashworth decided to fast for one day in
order to have a deeper appreciation for the fasting he witnessed over 3000 Muslim
athletes observe well during the Olympics of 2012.304 At the end of his experience he
had this to say about it: "Islam is a religion, sadly often much misunderstood in the
west and although my own experience was just for one day, I saw a religion which
took pride in extending kindness, peace and understanding to those within the religion
and those from outside."305
On a bigger scale, in 2011, the parliament enacted the Localism Act 306, which
now provides legal powers for all major local authorities to consider prayers as part of
formal business meetings, seeing as faith plays a vital part in the nation's culture and
heritage.307
F.

Finally

All of the previous examples reflect the economic socio-cultural appreciations
that the former Archbishop of Canterbury, followed by Lord Phillips, had attempted
to understand and raise awareness on through two profound lectures promoting the
understanding of Shari'a. In the turns of multiculturalism, Dr. Rowan Williams had
attempted to dispel a few myths about Shari'a. He expressed concerns for Muslims
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within the society who might face difficulty with social integration. 308 After thorough
study of the religious system, Williams concluded that individuals can lead a life as
abiding believers of the Shari'a without being in conflict with their rights, as
guaranteed by English laws.309
Given the wider context of the British system, it appears that Sir John
Donaldson words are highly accurate, that "the starting point of our domestic law is
that every citizens has a right to do what he likes, unless restrained by the common
law or by statute."310 The law has gone through many changes along the years and it
arrived to a successful point where "Muslim men and Muslim women are entitled to
be treated in exactly the same way as all other men and women in the country."311 The
law did develop and reformulate to focus not just on liberty, but also, on equality.
While it seeks to prevent anti-social behavior, and actions that cause harm onto
others, it regards all its citizens as equal.
Going back to Dr. Williams conclusion on Muslim citizens leading
harmonious lives, and bearing in the back of our minds that the religion of this paper
is international human rights, not Shari'a or British law, it seems clear that the legal
pretext strongly provides for the achievement and satisfaction of Muslims' civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights as UK citizens.
IX.

The Demand

Before evaluating the validity of the Demand, an understanding of the why
behind it is in order. The discussion will then move towards the hypothesizing of
possible three different scenarios in response to the demand of incorporating Shari'a
law into British law. Notwithstanding, this is not a critique of the religion; it is a
critique of the Demand and the possible advancements and/or consequences of each
scenario in light of the amalgamation between human rights law and Shari'a. 312 The
status quo discussion entertained in the previous chapter was aimed at providing a
grand picture of the society, to inform of how religious minorities are regarded in the
eyes of the law, and how much freedom of religion and practice does the UK
308
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government safeguard as a forefather/founding state of international human rights
law. Based on which, the scenarios will be evaluated.
On the left side of the spectrum, Islam is interpreted as the operative
framework for a patriarchal system, explained as the default and natural division of
social roles assigned by God.313 Perceived as a superior religion, in every aspect of
life, leftists believe it cannot be surpassed by any other religion or ideology.314 Thus
the implementation of Shari'a, both civil and criminal codes, is not just the core of this
school, it is the default. The evaluation of the principles and provisions called for is
based on their portrayal in the Islamic Prevent booklet distributed starting May 2011,
in protest of the previously discussed Prevent Strategy launched by the UK
government.
This Demand was first brought about in 2009, when a group of Islamists
introduced the Shari'a Zones project.315 This group is not representative of the entire
UK Muslim community;316 however, they have declared it is their duty to awaken
Muslims from the slumber and false peace brought about by western ideology.317
According to one leader behind this Demand, there are four ways to achieve
implementation of Islamic law: either via a collective Muslim rise in favor of it; or a
strong Muslim lobby on foreign policy towards its implementation; collective
choosing of a Shari'a-based system via elections; when all else fails, Muslims
necessarily seek its implementation via conflict.318 In the course of this paradigm,
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democracy and freedom are an anathema to Islam and Shari'a,319 they are alienable
concepts perceived as the fruits of Western ideological hegemony that tempt Muslims
to relinquish their religion and cede their government to secularism, which is a form
of corrupt man-made system incomparable with divine laws.320
Through the Shari'a Zones project, the Islamists group321 seeks to establish
safe neighborhoods where vigilante forces implement the rules set forth by their
interpretation of Islamic law for many reasons. Firstly, they seek to prove to the rest
of society that Islamic rules maintain safety and prevent unorthodox behavior
associated with western practices such as gambling, prostitution and consumption of
alcohol322 that bring about moral destruction of society, and cause man to drift away
from the divine paved roads to heaven.323 Secondly, the zones are a tool through
which Islam can be welcomed and spread around the UK.324 In doing so, the group
believes that the zones will expand the more people welcome and join Islam, and
would seep into one another to create autonomous Islamic Emirates. 325 By the same
logic, these emirates will grow to devour the -then would be- smaller remaining
areas.326 Evidently, Islam will be the leading religion of the country. 327 That will also
accomplish the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate system.
Essentially, implementing both civil and criminal codes of Shari'a would be a
step towards realizing the Islamization of the UK. Life within the Shari'a Zones could
help provide a picture of a society under one such application of Shari'a. To allow the
surpassing of one religion over all others is not just to grant favor to that particular
religion, it is also to concede to its dictates regarding the status of other religious
minorities. Nonetheless, this discussion will entertain the advancements and/or
repercussions foretold in this scenario, in light of international human rights law; i.e.
as applied by the state, not the group. However, in this context, the supporters of this
demand both spoken for and unannounced until the outcome is clearer; have to be
distinguished from the general Muslim community.
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In several declarations by members of the group, non-Muslims were referred
to as kuffar.328 In Arabic, kufr refers to the pitch-blackness of the night, and is used to
refer to those of no religion; in English, it translates to infidel.329 When translated into
"state attitude", there will be a clear-cut distinction between Muslims and nonMuslims. What is falsely attributed to Islamic tolerance is in fact, non-Islamic and
intolerant. At the time of the Prophet -over 1400 years ago- Non-Muslims governed
by Islamic rule were "allowed relatively tolerable conditions… Jews under the
Ottoman Turks were often better off than Jews who lived under the European
Christians… Christians, too, sometimes fled to Islam for religious tolerance."330 Then,
they were referred to as Dhimmis;331 they were asked to pay taxes, jizya, in return for
state protection over life and property.332 As such, non-Muslims were allowed to
practice their religion; enjoy security provided for by the state; and conduct personal
matters under the auspices of respective private laws, through churches, temples and
so on.333 At the time, Jews were independent from the Shari'a law and sought
legal/religious aid from Halakha courts.334 For all other religious affairs that involved
restoring churches or building new ones, they had to acquire state approval;335 much
like the aforementioned regulations set forth by English legal system. However, these
Islamists have referred to non-Muslims as kuffar, equating them with people who
disbelief the existence of a God; who are still granted their freedom of belief in
Islam.336
Furthermore, through the booklet, UK Muslims are instructed to boycott nonMuslims as part of their overdue rejection of interfaith: they should not have nonMuslim friends,337 or integrate in a non-Muslim society;338 including and not limited
328
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to the celebration of Christmas and Easter.339 Evidently, any Muslim who have falsely
fell under the spell of Western tricks about democracy,340 social cohesion,341
nationalism and unity,342 should be rehabilitated and remedied from this social and
moral decline.343
In campaigning for the Shari'a Zones, and, again, their interpretation, of
Islamic law, members of the group paint a futuristic picture of a purely patriarchal
society, as drawn by God himself,344 where women are mothers and housewives. One
member's website sought to provide "evidence to prove a woman is for cooking and
cleaning".345 In this picture, women are additionally required to have husband's
permission to leave the house, refrain from using cosmetics, tabarujj, and have a male
companion in order to leave the country, mehrem.346
This scenario represents one perception of the good based on a restrictive
application derived by jurists such as Sayyid Qutb, Mohammed Al-Nawawi and Gad
El-Haq. It is a model where features of Western culture are viewed as "satanic
values", and socially integrated Muslims are to be rehabilitated.347 In addition to this
model's reflection of significant intolerance of the "other", it reflects the non-belief in
behavioral freedom. The apparent dislike of Western practices has translated into their
classification into Qutb's jahiliyya so much so that they will be tolerated. As such, AlTahtawi's behavioural freedom, along with cultural rights, will not be strong features,
if at all, in the application of this scenario.
The demand to boycott non-Muslims is a hostile act that drives intolerance to
inequality, which results in injustice. This inequality, however, will not apply to nonMuslims alone. After a thorough read of Anjem Choudary's vision of a new 'social
system', it becomes clear that non-males will be regarded with inferiority as well; i.e.
women. The description of women's role in this model represents a poor
understanding of equality, and a strong approval of a social paradigmatic shift
towards partiarchism.
The non-integration with non-Muslims encourages adherents of such
interpretation to become carriers of discriminatory ideologies that will ultimately, and
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immediately, develop a strong negative impact on the social rights of non-Muslims.
Unbeknownst to them, these carriers will initiate the achievement of a mafsad
("harm"), which is the exact opposite of Shari'a's maqasid:348 when state has failed to
safeguard the individual's faith.
This restrictive interpretation presupposes a certain perception of good that
does not necessarily await Abdel Raziq's notion of agreement of the Muslim
community, certainly not the inferiorized non-Muslim community. Consequently, the
ruler, possibly the caliph in this situation will rule as he sees fit. This has to remind of
Al-Tahtawi's impression of rulers who ruled by whim, the lack of freedom that
overwhelmed Egypt in the 19th century, versus the justice and equity he witnessed in
France at the time. Such a development will cause the deterioration of political and
civil freedoms, the people will not be restricted in their political participation; and
their rights as citizens will be diminished.
Seeing that rulers and caliphs of such states are tools who guide the masses to
apply the will of God, invested in the Shari'a, and protect them from corrupt manmade laws, it becomes difficult, almost naïve, to expect this state to adhere by the
universal provision of international human rights; which are essentially man-made
laws.
This model promotes the imposition of restrictions on individual freedoms and
the equal enjoyment of rights, along with the stripping of equal standing before the
law and the subjective optimization of a religion to dominate others. In accordance
with the amalgamation tailored in the previous chapter, the aforementioned model, if
materialized, will introduce a new status quo where justice, equality, freedom and
public interest will become alien principles.
X.

The Compromise

Sparked by the intellectual and grounded suggestion of Dr. Rowan Williams in
the 2008 lecture, the incorporation of the Shari'a civil code is the second scenario to
be entertained. Although what Williams justified with evidence and a sense of liberal
realism was widely unaccepted and critiqued by many, it still resonated with others
who made the effort to emphasize and break down. One such attempt was a
subsequent lecture by Lord Phillips. This scenario is an entertainment of both
suggestions and concerns inspired by both lecturers' contribution to the debate on
English legal tolerance of religious minorities; particularly Islam. While Williams
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focused his lecture on the role of Shari'a in relation to British law in order to arrive at
a midway position between being a citizen and a Muslim, Phillips questioned whether
the law treats everyone equally to conclude that English law is pridefully secular, thus
it would be difficult for Shari'a to be embraced further.
Dr. Williams started his lecture addressing the concerns and growing fears
evoked by the challenges of the dominance of Shari'a. 349 He explained how the
universal principles of Shari'a are actualized, as understood by intellectuals and
Islamic theologians, and not ready-made.350 What is actualized for him and others is
that these principles are non-negotiable and that they assume the "voluntary consent
or submission of the believer."351 In arguing for that conviction, Williams exclaimed
the possibility of ijtihad, as opposed to the collation of traditional judgments.352
However, the actualizations do differ from one school to the other. The imposition of
Shari'a' on everyone and the persistence on the lack of harmony between Islamic law
and IHRL is the understanding of some. Evidently, many Arab countries promote the
belonging to a Muslim community along with belonging to political community;
Williams himself spoke of Jordan and Morocco, and even the Pakistani state under
Jinnah as evidence that memberships in both are not necessarily coterminous.353
The call for the domination of Islam touches upon the debate regarding
secularism v. religious rule. If both concepts are not coterminous, then it begs the
ultimatum of choice. Where a conceptualization based on citizenship entails political
hegemony, an Islamic-based one designates the divine covenant to be stand-alone.354
Based on the previous scenario, the latter choice is inapplicable for its infringements
on entitlements; which are all provoked according to the actualization of some. Thus,
Williams explained the importance to finding a "just and constructive relationship
between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United Kingdom," especially for the
sake of the common good.355 While the former choice may seem more appealing to
religious minorities and other ethnic groups, it is vital to bear in mind that the laws
instigated by this system will reflect the predisposition of legislators; whether they are
tolerant, welcoming to diversity or discriminatory by nature.356
In compromise of the two mutually exclusive monopolies, Williams touched
upon the legitimization of Islamic principles; such as family law, matrimonial affairs
349
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and financial relations.357 He also promoted transformative accommodation, which
allows an individual to choose his or her own means of jurisdiction and mediation as
well.358 This accommodation, he justified, combats social alienation such as ghettoism
that might cause the disenfranchising of minorities.359
While plausible suggestions, Lord Phillips found implications that beg
reconsideration, both on the grounds of sufficient existing toleration, and legal
enforceability. Overall, there are 30 parliamentary acts addressing discrimination
alone in English law.360 Evidently, Muslims are recognized by religion, rather than
race.361 The regulations concerning payment of mortgages have been modified twice
so as not to offend Islamic principles; which regards to paying ribba ("interest").362
Shari'a courts are allowed to mediate conflicts as a peaceful mean of settling
disputes.363 Therefore, Lord Phillips believes that the UK government has already
gone a long way to embrace its Muslim community and tailor to its needs.364
On the legal side, Phillips points out implications regarding the failure to
comply with suggested adjustments to English law. When judges dismiss the religious
workings on society in the course of cases with a religious element, not only do they
affect -in their rulings- the citizen's entitlements of rights, but also, fail to reinforce
the position envisioned by the lawmakers.365 The injunction of Islamic law can be
refuted on the merits that complying with some of its implications would create a
divide between rights for citizens and rights for Muslims. Phillips provides the
example of apostasy, for which the punishment can range from excommunication366 to
death367; depending on the definition and the applied school of thought. As such,
penalties provided for in Shari'a cannot be enacted through English courts, and the
sanctions befalling the failure to comply should rest within the hands of independent
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judges. One simple answer would be to designate the governing laws of any contracts
upon their establishment.368 At the core of it, Phillips refutes the application of the
rules of one religion over others seeing that the law already safeguards tolerance and
mutual respect among different people.369
In essence, to arrive at a just and constructive relationship between both legal
systems, it serves to consider providing judges with appropriate legal tools in order to
decide on cases with a religious element. The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction is
one method to be considered in trying to reach a compromise for the demand of
Shari'a incorporation. If instigated by the state, this doctrine would allow for the
temporary extension of one court's jurisdiction over all other matters and claims
related to the case before it.370 In this scenario, it plays to extend an English court's
jurisdiction to Shari'a courts so as to have a bigger picture of a dispute before it.
Moreover, religious know-how would be accessible to lawyers and judges. Instigating
this doctrine would apply to all religious courts, hence, no scales would be tipped in
favor of one minority over another.
XI.

The Multicultural Fix

The current status quo in UK presents significant resistance to the demand.
Muslims compromise only 4.7% of the population,371 a significant mainstream of
which appreciate the multifaith and multicultural nature of the British society, and do
not support the Islamist call for Islamic dominion. Additionally, the interpretation
offered by Islamists, as touched upon in the first scenario, has provoked numerous
human rights activists to counter-demand the government, and rally the people, not
subdue to such fundamentalist assertions.
Through reflections by representatives of the Muslim Council of Britain
(MCB)372, both emphasized the minute percentage of the Islamists behind such a
demand.373 With a 1.6 Million Muslim residing in the UK,374 some concentrations are
said to behave as Shari'a Zones, one example would be the Tower Hamlets area with a
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71,000 Muslim residents.375 According to Helbawi, who assumed that all these
residents approve of the Zones' project, they would compromise an insignificant
0.12% of the total population.376 While both acknowledge individual rights and
entitlements, as Murad clarified, the demand called for is not a concern for the greater
Muslim British majority.377
While the board of the MCB did refrained from responding to the rallies and
protests by members of the Islamist group, other Muslims took up a more pro-active
response and counter-rallied. In response to Islam4UK, a group of Muslim youth
sought to campaign against the imposition of a one interpretation of Shari'a, and also
to promote UK multiculturalism. Mr. Inayat Bunglawala, founder of Muslims4UK,
contributed a long list of writings to promote social cohesion and condemn the
fundamentalist hands attempting to dissolve it. Furthermore, Muslims4UK have
launched several counter-rallies to promote UK multicultural and multifaith
society.378
Of the most active humanitarian groups is the One Law for All campaign.
Comprised of mostly feminist activists, the campaign contributes in whichever way
they can to raise awareness on the human rights hazards and violations if Shari'a law
was ever implemented.379 Spokesperson Ann-Marie Waters described:
"Our campaign is against the use of religious laws in family or
criminal matters - we believe these areas fundamentally affect
people's basic human rights and therefore should be conducted under
a single, secular and democratically mandated legal system. This legal
system should apply to all people - no distinctions or exceptions for
religion or culture. If Muslims are to live their private lives in
accordance with Shari'a, that is their right. However, as soon as they
begin to impose Shari'a onto another person, it ceases to be a private
matter and becomes a matter for public law.380
With this significant counter movement, the current status quo seems
approved of and promoted, not just by the Muslim community in the UK, but also by
many factions and ideological organizations as well. On this side of the debate, the
UK is perceived as a "world-leader in democracy and human rights… a citizen has a
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right to live their lives in accordance with their religion. They do not have a right to
demand that a state impose that religion - or a specific interpretation of that religion onto others."381 There seems to be strong appreciation of the diversity, justice,
equality and freedom safeguarded and promoted by the state.
XII. An Assertion
Britain's first Muslim counter-extremism think-tank was co-founded by Ed
Husain; a former Islamic fundamentalist who came to reject extremism after five
years of being an operative and a recruiter.382 In a book titled, The Islamist, Husain
narrated his own journey from a theatre-loving boy to an Islamic fundamentalist, then
to a rejecter of such fundamentalism.383 The turning point at which Husain
consciously rejected the beliefsystem of five years, his observations and personal
reflections will serve to help have a better understanding the psyche of the people
promoting this demand. More so, they will help assert their misguided aim and their
non-relevance to the true higher objectives of Islam.
Ed Husain was an active operative; he was recruited by the Young Muslim
Organization, then moved to Hizb ut-Tahrir ("liberation party").384 The moment
Husain's strong belief in Islamic fundamentalism shook to its core was when an
innocent's life was wasted: a Christian boy, a colleague of Husain's, lost his life at the
hands of Islamists youths after a row over pool tables.385 The realization of the
atmosphere he had helped create, where the value of life of a non-Muslim had become
"of little consequence in attaining Muslim dominance."386 Husain believed the murder
was "the direct result of Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideas."387 Moreover, Husain blamed Omar
Bakri Muahmmad for the poisonous hizb atmosphere created.388 The insignificant
value of life reflected in this story was only supported by Husain's description of a
discussion with a college professor who compared the Nazi ideology of a superior
race with that of Islamic fundamentalism.389 At which point, Husain confessed in his
book how Islamic fundamentalists (minimally, the ones he encountered) did not look
381
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back the holocaust as an atrocity.390 This notable sense of intellectual superiority,
Husain described, was rooted in the message propagated by such Islamists: true
Muslims are superior to all others faiths; including and not limited to partial Muslism
(defined as ones accepting to abide by man-made laws and integrating with the nonMuslim society).391 In the teachings of those fundamentalists, Husain quoted, parents
who did not believe in the goal of the organization were obstacles in achieving 'God's
work'; with which ties should be severed.392
In that context, non-Muslims are referred to as kuffar against which hatred was
repeatedly incited. Husain reported being trained to connect local issues with global
issues to promulgate a universal hatred towards Muslims and necessitate their unity
and struggle against the hostile non-Muslim societies in the world:
"They slaughter us in Bosnia, expel us from our homes in Palestine,
and refuse us the basic right to pray in Britain." I would say to
students in the corridors. Again, just as the hizb had trained usÖ
management [at college] was increasingly perceived as anti-Muslim
and racist. At the same time we opened a second front to our
confrontation, this time with Sikhs and Hindus.393
On the inside, Husain shared two very notable observations. The first being the
hypocrisy on segregation of the sexes: where a constitutional draft (prepared by a
hizb) leader strictly forbade the mixing of the sexes in any context.394 Whereas, he
reported the non-issue of this prescription in then-current hizb meetings; to the extent
he questioned the prescription of behavior for Muslims that the hizb itself was not
adhering to.395
The other, and final, observation Husain made was his comparison between
his identification to God, with Faye's (his love interest).391 Coming from the same
social, cultural and education background as his family's, Faye was also a devout
Muslim, untainted by 'Islamic' associations.396 Towards the end of his fifth year,
Husain noted the difference in their perception of God: Faye's God was "close, loving,
caring, facilitating, forgiving and merciful."397 Whereas Husain's God was "full of
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vengeance, a legislator, a controller and a punisher."398
XIII. Conclusion
Such enlightening experience included significant details that prelude to the
mental and intellectual birth of an Islamic fundamentalist. The psyche of whom
perceives Islam as a religion with no justice or equality, with no relevance to the value
of life, with rationalized severance of lineage ties, with no space for freedom; all
through a more rationalized sense of superiority and authority to others. All of which
effectively falls short of the true understanding of Islam and of human rights.
Husain's experience is highlighted to serve as the concluding remarks to be put
forth. Had the group promulgated a perception of 'good' that entailed more justice,
tolerance, equality or mercy, their project would have been truly of Islamic nature.
The problem lies in their misguided use of what is an essentially spiritual relationship,
as a tool for political domination. This research had illustrated to different perceptions
of Islam, one that adheres to justice and equality of all, and another employed to fill
intellects and hearts with an artificial of superiority. A person who seeks to pollute
others' perceptions with hatred, anger and presumed suffering, is not a Muslim; but a
con artist.
At the core, the preliminary demand is far from viable. The last scenario,
presumably, would be called for by entirely secularist counter movements such as
One Law for All; understandably driven by concern over the repercussions of allowing
such a rigid interpretation of Shari'a to apply -with particular emphasis to women and
children. Of the three scenarios, the incorporation of both civil and criminal branches
of Shari'a stands as highly unlikely seeing the small momentum behind the project.
The examination of the British system, in terms of both law and society, has
highlighted the progression towards the Compromise; i.e. the adoption the civil
provisions of Shari'a: growing Islamic financial system and recognition of Sharia'
courts.
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